





iTesla Project

Innovative Tools for Electrical System Security within Large Areas

Detailed architecture of the security assessment process

Brussels, Tuesday 14 January, 2014



Targeted solution:

Account for:

- Time horizon
- Correlations

Sliding time window from quasi-real time to 24-48 hours ahead

Renewabl e & Load Uncertainties

Dynamics

Action recommendation

New "online" security assessment

Farther time horizons, increasing uncertainties




Targeted solution:

Corrective actions first
Expected costs assumed
smaller than with preventive
actions

Preventive actions

Minimal amount to complement corrective actions






Targeted solution:

Security rules
Used for contingency
filtering
Computed offline, based on
•extensive analyses
•TSO rules

"Per contingency"

Applied to the "N" state, but they account for the contingency outcome!

Encapsulate static & dynamic constraints





Rationale

Ultimate aim: assess security of next states

•Are *available* corrective resources sufficient?

•Are any preventive actions needed?

By when do they have to be started?

- •What is the last «useful» time to trigger the actions?
 - Last Time To Decide








Classification




CLUSTER 2 & 3 & 4

of contingencies Uncertainties

- Cluster 1
 - no action
- Cluster 2
 - correctiveactions
- Cluster 3
 - corrective +preventive actions
- Cluster 4
 - «Strategic» actions needed











Proposed final architecture





Final architecture - Detail





Online work flow

Forecast state building

Contingency Filtering


Stage 1

Stage 2

Stage 3

Detailed analysis


Results





Filtering (1): «Worst State»

 Different acceptable domains for the system states are generally used in the operation of transmission grids. Limits related to overloads of power lines depend on the duration of violation of these limits (thermal problem)





Filtering (1): «Worst State»

Preliminary filtering

- Offline security rules based on active power
- DC model
- Corrective actions
- Static optimisation
- Very conservative


Pre-fault

Post-fault

Post-fault corrective actions




Security assessment under uncertainty: Worst State approach pictorial examples





Filtering (2): «Monte Carlo-Like» Approach

- Samples of operating states within the uncertainty cloud
- Correlations of forecast errors
- Offline security rules based on AC quantities
- Decision Tree (DT) -based security rules
- Samples deemed unsecure go to next stage






Filtering (2): «Monte Carlo-Like» Approach


- Sampling of forecast errors
 - Accounting for correlations
 - Formally, same process as to create «generic» plausible states for security rule generation (see next presentation)

$$P_{\text{sample}} = P_{\text{forecast}} + \Delta P_{\text{error}}$$

Offline, computed periodically



Online






Filtering (3): Corrective Control

State under analysis


Optimisation





Time-Domain Simulation


- Perform detailed analysis of the set of state& contingency identified as possibly dangerous
- Check preventive and corrective control actions
- Exploits algorithms to detect instabilities and violations from swing curves





Fuzzy Power Flow

- Meant as parallel to the main online workflow:
 - Allow independent validation of the filtering
 - Show integrability features of iTESLA
- Uncertainties evaluated in a qualitative way
- Static tool, used for contingency analysis







Synthesis of the results

Results interface

- Steady-state constraints per contingency
- Transient stability info
- List of recommended preventive actions and simulated curative actions





Synthesis of recommendations for the operator